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Nora Astorga

Nora Astorga

Nora Astorga (1944 - 1988) was a guerrilla fighter in the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, a lawyer, politician, judge, and the Nicaraguan ambassador to the United Nations from 1986 to 1988. She was born to an upperclass family in Managua. Astorga studied law at the Catholic University of Washington and the Universidad Centroamericana de Managua. During the Somoza regime, she led a double life, serving as a corporate lawyer and mother of two, but also secretly helping the Sandinista revolutionaries. She undertook searches for political prisoners and allowed Sandinistas to use her home as a meeting place. Astorga gained national attention for her participation in the botched kidnapping and murder of General Reynaldo Pérez Vega (nicknamed El Caro, or "The Dog"). Pérez Vega was deputy commander of Anastasio Somoza’s National Guard. On March 8, 1978 (International Women's Day, ironically) Astorga invited the General to her apartment in Managua, hinting to him that the sexual favors he had long been seeking would be granted. When he arrived, however, members of the Sandanista Liberation Army, among them Hilario Sánchez and Walter Ferreti, burst out of her bedroom closet and seized the General. The plan was to ransom him for jailed Sandanista revolutionaries, but Pérez Vega put up a struggle, and he was murdered. Later, his throat slit, he was found wrapped in a Sandinista flag. Astorga said of his murder, "I never felt guilty... It was something you had to do for revolutionary justice. He had killed so many. He was a monster." She became the subject of a national manhunt, and next appeared to the Nicaraguan public on the pages of La Prensa, the nation's opposition newspaper. She was wearing jungle fatigues and carrying an AK-47 assault rifle. Astorga had escaped to the jungle and joined the Sandinista revolutionaries. After the Sandinistas took power in July 1979, she was appointed chief special prosecutor at the trials of some 7,500 members of Somoza's National Guard. In 1984, her appointment as ambassador to the United States was refused by the Reagan administration because of her involvement in the killing of General Reynaldo Pérez Vega. She became a deputy representative to the United Nations in 1984, and in March, 1986, became the Nicaraguan ambassador to that body. She was instrumental in getting the United Nations to recognize a ruling by the World Court declaring United States' support for the Contras illegal. On Valentine's Day in 1988, Astorga died of cervical cancer in Managua. She was awarded the title "Hero of the Fatherland" and remembered as Ambassador of Love, Life and Peace. She appears as one of the twelve apostles in the mural of the Visitación at Casa Ave Maria in Managua. A barrio, or neighborhood, in Managua is named for her. Category:Women in war Astorga, Nora Category:Nicaraguan politicians

Nicaraguan revolution

:Sandinista! is also the name of a popular music album by The Clash. The Clash The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) is a leftist political party that ruled Nicaragua for roughly 12 years from 1979 to 1990. It is generally referred to by the initialism FSLN and its members are called, in both English and Spanish, Sandinistas. For many decades it was the main opposition group against the U.S.-backed dictatorship of the Somoza family. After emerging victorious from a brief civil war it formed the government of Nicaragua from 1979 until 1990, during which time it faced heavy opposition from the United States due to its Marxist ideology and resulting closeness with communist bloc countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, and Algeria. It lost the February 25, 1990 elections and peacefully surrendered power. The FSLN remains the country's leading political opposition to the current governing Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC).

Opposition to Somoza (1961–1979)

The FSLN was formally organised on July 23, 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge Martínez and Silvio Mayorga. It eventually became Marxist-aligned, and like many Communist groups began to present its struggle as a "movement for national liberation"; they claimed that the old government was oppressing and exploiting the Nicaraguan people and violating their rights, and promised to remedy these injustices. The Sandinistas took their name from Augusto César Sandino (1895-1934), a leader in the country's nationalist rebellion against the United States military occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and early 1930s until his assassination by the U.S.-created Guardia Nacional (National Guard) enabled Somoza to seize control of the country. Inspired and supported by the Cubans, the FSLN tried with little success to organise guerrilla warfare against Somoza in the 1960s. In the 1970s, it began to attract significant support from the country's increasingly politicised peasantry and from other sectors of the population in response to the U.S.-supported dictatorship's brutality and corruption, especially after the earthquake that levelled the capital city, Managua, on 23 December 1972. The earthquake killed 20,000 of the city's 400,000 residents and left another 250,000 homeless. Somoza's National Guard embezzled much of the international aid that flowed into the country to assist in reconstruction, and several parts of downtown Managua were never rebuilt. This overt corruption caused even people who had previously supported the regime, such as business leaders, to turn against Somoza and call for his overthrow. During the long struggle against Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the FSLN leaders' internal disagreements over strategy and tactics were reflected in three main factions:
- The guerra popular prolongada ("prolonged popular war") faction was rural-based and sought long-term "silent accumulation of forces" within the country's large peasant population, which it saw as the main social base for the revolution.
- The tendencia proletaria ("proletarian tendency"), led by Jaime Wheelock, reflected an orthodox Marxist approach that sought to organise urban workers.
- The tercerista ("third way") faction, led by Humberto and Daniel Ortega Saavedra, was ideologically eclectic, favouring a more rapid insurrectional strategy in alliance with diverse sectors of the country, including business owners, churches, students, the middle class, unemployed youth and the inhabitants of shantytowns. The terceristas also helped attract popular and international support by organising a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen (known as "the Twelve"), who called for Somoza's removal and sought to organise a provisional government from Costa Rica. On 10 January 1978, the assassination of Pedro Chamorro, who edited the anti-Somoza newspaper La Prensa, sparked a broad uprising against the regime, with the Sandinistas leading a combination of general strikes, urban uprisings and rural guerrilla attacks that increasingly demoralised the National Guard. With a moral and material help of many Latin American countries, Sandinistas launched liberation war from Costa Rica territory. Despite an overwhelming superiority in arms and ruthless tactics that included the aerial bombardment of Nicaraguan cities, Somoza's army disintegrated; he fled the country on 17 July 1979, and was later assassinated in Paraguay. Two days after Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas entered Managua and were greeted by huge crowds as national liberators.

Cuban assistance

Beginning in 1967 the Cuban General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, had begun to establish ties with various Nicaraguan revolutionary organisations. By 1970 the DGI had managed to train hundreds of Sandinista guerrilla leaders and had vast influence over the organisation. In 1969 the DGI had financed and organised an operation to free the jailed Sandinista leader Carlos Fonseca from his prison in Costa Rica. Fonseca was re-captured shortly after the jail break, but after a plane carrying executives from the United Fruit Company was hijacked by the FSLN, he was freed and allowed to travel to Cuba. DGI chief Manuel "Redbeard" Piñeiro commented that "of all the countries in Latin America, the most active work being carried out by us is in Nicaragua." However, one should keep in mind that there were many other Cuban operations throughout the world [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cuban_espionage_and_related_extraterritorial_activity_revised&action=edit§ion=5]. The DGI, with Fidel Castro's personal blessing, also collaborated with the FSLN on the botched assassination attempt of Turner Shelton, the U.S. ambassador in Managua and a close friend to the Somoza family. The FSLN managed to secure several hostages exchanging them for safe passage to Cuba and a one million dollar ransom. After the successful ouster of Somoza, DGI involvement in the new Sandinista government expanded rapidly. An early indication of the central role that the DGI would play in the Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship is a meeting in Havana on July 27, 1979, at which diplomatic ties between the two countries were re-established after more than 25 years. Julián López Díaz, a prominent DGI agent, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua. Cuban military and DGI advisors initially brought in during the Sandinista insurgency, would swell to over 2,500 and operated at all levels of the new Nicaraguan government. Sandinista defector Álvaro Baldizón alleged that Cuban influence in Nicaragua's Interior Ministry (MINT) was more extensive than was widely believed at the time and Cuban "advice" and "observations" were treated as though they were orders. While the Cubans would like to have helped more in the development of Nicaragua towards socialism, they realized that they were no match for the United States' pressure on Latin America. Following the invasion of Grenada, countries previously looking for support from Cuba saw that they had little power to fight the United States when it chose to take action. [Banana Republic, Roy Gutman, 1988]

Sandinista rule (1979–1990)

The Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins, with a debt of 1.6 billion dollars (US), an estimated 50,000 war dead, 600,000 homeless, and a devastated economic infrastructure. To begin the task of establishing a new government, they created a Council (or junta) of National Reconstruction, made up of five members – Sandinista militants Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan, novelist Sergio Ramírez Mercado (a member of "the Twelve"), businessman Alfonso Rebelo Callejas, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). The preponderance of power, however, remained with the Sandinistas and their mass organisations, including the Sandinista Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores), the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza), and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos). While prominent rebel leaders such as Daniel Ortega were strongly Marxist, the new junta initially contained a broad spectrum of ideology. Upon assuming power, its political platform included the following:
- Nationalisation of property owned by the Somozas and their collaborators.
- Land reform.
- Improved rural and urban working conditions.
- Free unionisation for all workers, both urban and rural.
- Control of living costs, especially basic necessities (food, clothing, and medicine).
- Improved public services, housing conditions, education (mandatory, free through high school; schools available to the whole national population; national literacy campaign).
- Nationalisation and protection of natural resources, including mines.
- Abolition of torture, political assassination and the death penalty.
- Protection of democratic liberties (freedom of expression, political organisation and association, and religion; return of political exiles).
- Equality for women.
- Free, non-aligned foreign policy and relations.
- Formation of a new, democratic, and popular army under the leadership of the FSLN.
- Pesticide controls
- Rain forest conservation
- Wildlife conservation
- Alternative energy programs One of the most notable successes of the revolution was the literacy campaign, which saw teachers flood the countryside. Within six months, half a million people had been taught to read, bringing the national illiteracy rate down from over 50 per cent to just under 13 per cent. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated as literacy teachers. One of the stated aims of the literacy campaign was to create a literate electorate which would be able to make informed choices at the promised elections. The great success of the literacy campaign was recognised by UNESCO with the award of a Nadezhda Krupskaya International Prize. The FSLN also created neighbourhood groups, similar to the Cuban Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, called Sandinista Defence Committees (Comités de Defensa Sandinista or CDS). Especially in the early days following the overthrow of Somoza, the CDSs served as de facto units of local governance, distributing food rations, organising neighbourhood cleanup and recreational activities, and policing to control looting and apprehend remnants of the National Guard. During the subsequent Contra war, they also organised civilian defence efforts against Contra attacks. Critics of the Sandinistas decried the CDS as a system of local spy networks for the government, and a means of political control. By 1980, conflicts began to emerge between the Sandinista and non-Sandinista members of the governing junta. Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta in 1980, and the governing role of the Sandinistas became obvious as Ortega and his allies consolidated power. Allegations spread among critics that the Ortega clique were planning to turn Nicaragua into a Communist state like Cuba. In 1981, the U.S. administration of Ronald Reagan began organising remnants of Somoza's National Guard into guerrilla bands known as "Contras" (short for "contrarrevolucionarios", or counter-revolutionaries) that conducted attacks on economic, military, and civilian targets. During the Contra war, the Sandinistas arrested suspected Contras and censored La Prensa as well as other publications that they accused of collaborating with the U.S. and the Contras to destabilise the country. In contrast to the Cuban revolution, the Sandinista government practised political pluralism throughout its time in power. A broad range of new political parties emerged that had not been allowed under Somoza. Following promulgation of a new constitution, Nicaragua held national elections in 1984. Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez were elected president and vice-president, and the FSLN won 61 out of 90 seats in the new National Assembly, having taken 63 per cent of the vote on a turnout of 74%. Independent electoral observers from around the world, including the UN, stated that the elections had been free and fair. The United States refused to recognise them, alleging that the opposition had been marginalised in the media and elsewhere by the government; United States President Ronald Reagan denounced the elections as a sham. Ronald Reagan, 1980. It reads "If the Gringos intervene (i.e. invade), the militias will stop them!!!"]]

Sandinistas vs. Contras

Main articles: Contras and Iran-Contra affair Upon assuming office in 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan condemned the FSLN for joining with Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries such as El Salvador. His administration authorised the CIA to begin financing, arming and training the remnants of Somoza's National Guard as anti-Sandinista guerrillas that were branded "counter-revolutionary" by leftists (contrarrevolucionarios in Spanish). This was inevitably shortened to Contras, a label the anti-Communist forces chose to embrace. Eden Pastora and many of the indigenous guerrilla forces, who were not associated with the "Somozistas," also resisted the Sandinistas. They operated out of camps in the neighbouring countries of Honduras to the north and Costa Rica (see Eden Pastora cited below) to the south. The U.S. also sought to place economic pressure on Nicaragua; the Reagan administration imposed a full trade embargo, and the CIA disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua's Corinto harbour, an action condemned by the World Court as illegal. As was typical in guerrilla warfare, the Contras were engaged in a campaign of economic sabotage in an attempt to combat the Sandinista government. The armed resistance to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica initially called itself the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and was known as the 15th of September Legion. It later formed an alliance, called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which comprised other groups including MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan Democratic Union. Together, the members of these groups were generally called Contras. The Sandinistas condemned them as terrorists, and human rights organisations expressed serious concerns over reports of Contra attacks on civilians. In 1982, under pressure from Congress, the U.S. State Department declared Contra activities terrorism. The Congressional intelligence committee confirmed reports of Contra atrocities such as rape, torture, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings. After the U.S. Congress prohibited federal funding of the Contras in 1983, the Reagan administration continued to back the Contras by covertly selling arms to Iran and channelling the proceeds to the Contras (The Iran-Contra affair.) When this scheme was revealed, Reagan admitted that he knew about the Iranian "arms for hostages" dealings but professed ignorance about the proceeds funding the Contras; for this, National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North took much of the blame. Senator John Kerry's 1988 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra-drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/index.htm] According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, Panama's drug-lord. The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance, linking the origins of crack cocaine in California to the contras. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the contras. Sen. John Kerry's report in 1988 led to the same conclusions. The Contra war unfolded differently in the northern and southern zones of Nicaragua. Contras based in Costa Rica operated in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, which is sparsely populated by indigenous groups including the Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Garifuno, and Mestizo. Unlike Spanish-speaking western Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast is predominantly English-speaking and was largely ignored by the Somoza regime. The costeños did not participate in the uprising against Somoza and viewed Sandinismo with suspicion from the outset.

Sandinista human rights abuses

Lacking support from the population in that part of the country, Sandinista troops committed their most controversial activities (as far as human rights are concerned) on the Atlantic Coast, including the forcible relocation of 8,500 Miskito from their land to create free-fire zones for combatting the Contras. They also killed and imprisoned several indigenous people suspected of Contra collaboration. On two separate occasions in 1981 and 1982, Sandinista troops committed massacres in which approximately (UNHCR Report) 34 Miskito Indians died. However many Sandinista supporters claim this pales in comparison to the deaths attributed to the Contras. [http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Miskitoeng/part1.htm] During the war Amnesty International and other groups reported that political prisoners in Sandinista prisons, such as in Las Tejas, were beaten, deprived of sleep and tortured with electric shocks. They were denied food and water and kept in dark cubicles that had a surface of less than one square metre, known as chiquitas ("little ones.") These cubicles were too small to sit up in and had no sanitation and almost no ventilation. In the mid-1980s, under pressure from human rights organizations and widespread international condemnation, the Sandinista government acknowledged errors in its dealings with the Atlantic Coast and successfully negotiated an end to the southern front of the Contra war. In fulfillment of the terms of that negotiation, the National Assembly unanimously passed an Autonomy Law in 1987 that made Nicaragua the first Latin American nation to recognise its multiethnic nature, guaranteeing the economic, cultural, linguistic and religious rights demanded by the indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast. The Reagan administration remained opposed to the Sandinistas, and continued to support the Contras. The administration also funnelled USD $11 million in support of an opposition party, and refused aid to the country after it was devastated by Hurricane Joan in October 1988.

Relationship with the Catholic Church

The Sandinistas' relationship with the Roman Catholic Church deteriorated as the Contra War dragged on. State media accused the Catholic Church of being reactionary and supporting the Contras. According to former President Ortega, "The conflict with the church was strong, and it cost us, but I don't think it was our fault... ...There were so many people being wounded every day, so many people dying, and it was hard for us to understand the position of the church hierarchy in refusing to condemn the contras." Hostility to the Catholic Church became so great that at one point, "...FSLN militants shouted down Pope John Paul II as he tried to say Mass." [http://www.fiu.edu/~yaf/sand71899.html]

Opposition (since 1990)

On February 26, 1990, Nicaragua held its second national election following the 1979 revolution, and this time the Sandinistas lost to the United Nicaraguan Opposition, an alliance of 14 opposition parties ranging from the conservative business organisation COSEP to Nicaraguan communists (see Nicaraguan Socialist Party. UNO's candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, replaced Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua. Reasons for the Sandinista loss in 1990 are disputed. Defenders of the defeated government assert that Nicaraguans voted for the opposition due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo and potential Contra threat. Opponents claim that Contra warfare had largely died down, and that the Sandinistas had grown increasingly unpopular, particularly due to forced conscription and crackdowns on political freedoms. They also point out that the Sandinistas lost both the 1996 and 2001 elections with no Contra threat or outside pressures from the U.S. After their loss, some of the Sandinista leaders held part of the property that had been nationalised by the FSLN government. This process became known as the piñata and was tolerated by the new government. Prominent Sandinistas also created a number of nongovernmental organisations to promote their ideas and social goals, such as the Augusto César Sandino Foundation (FACS). Daniel Ortega remained the head of the FSLN, but his brother Humberto resigned from the party and remained at the head of the Sandinista Army, becoming a close confidante and supporter of Chamorro. The party also experienced a number of internal divisions, with prominent Sandinistas such as Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez resigning to protest what they described as heavy-handed domination of the party by Daniel Ortega. Ramírez also founded a separate political party, the Movement for the Renovation of Sandinismo (MRS); his faction came to be known as the renovistas, who favor a more social democratic approach than the orthodoxos, or hardliners. In the 1996 Nicaraguan election, Ortega and Ramírez both campaigned unsuccessfully as presidential candidates on behalf of their respective parties, with Ortega receiving 43 percent of the vote while Arnoldo Alemán of the Constitutional Liberal Party received 51 percent. Daniel Ortega was re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in 1998. Municipal elections in November 2000 saw a strong Sandinista vote, especially in urban areas, and former Tourism Minister Herty Lewites was elected mayor of Managua. This significant result led to expectations of a close race in the presidential elections scheduled for November 2001. Daniel Ortega and Enrique Bolaños of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) ran neck and neck in the polls for much of the campaign, but in the end the PLC won a clear victory. At these elections, 4 November 2001, the party won 42.1 % of the popular vote and 43 out of 90 seats. The same day, José Daniel Ortega Saavedra was defeated by the Enrique Bolaños Geyer of the Constitutional Liberal Party, winning only 42.3 %. Daniel Ortega, who still enjoys the use of confiscated estates, was once again re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in March 2002. Ortega's recent alliance with the partisans of Alemán (now in jail for for corruption) to attempt to unseat democratically elected Bolaños, seems to have come apart.

Symbols

The flag of the FSLN consists of an upper half in red, the lower half in black and the letters F S L N in white.

Prominent Sandinistas


- Bayardo Arce, hard-line National Directorate member in the 1980s
- Patrick Arguello, a Sandinista involved with the Dawson's Field hijackings
- Monica Baltodano
- Tomás Borge, one of the FSLN's founders, leader of the explicitly Marxist Prolonged Popular War tendency in the 1970s, Minister of Interior in the 1980s
- Omar Cabezas
- Ernesto Cardenal, poet and Catholic priest, Minister of Culture in the 1980s
- Luis Carrion, National Directorate member in the 1980s
- Miguel d'Escoto, a Maryknoll Catholic priest, served as Nicaragua's foreign minister
- Carlos Fonseca, one of the FSLN's principal founders and leading ideologist in the 1960s
- Herty Lewites, former mayor of Managua, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 2005
- Vilma Núñez
- Daniel Ortega, post-revolution junta head, then President from 1985, lost presidential elections in 1990, 1996, and 2001, but continues to control the FSLN party
- Humberto Ortega, leader of the FSLN Insurrectional Tendency (Tercerista) in the 1970s, chief strategist of the anti-Somoza urban insurrection, Minister of Defense in the 1980s during the Contra war
- Edén Pastora, "Comandante Cero," social democratic guerrilla leader who joined the Terceristas during the anti-Somoza insurrection, broke with FSLN to lead center-left ARDE contra group based in Costa Rica during the early 1980s
- Sergio Ramirez, novelist and civilian Sandinista, architect of alliance with moderates in 1970s, Vice President in 1980s, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 1990s
- Henry Ruíz, "Comandante Modesto," FSLN rural guerrilla commander in the 1970s, member of the National Directorate in the 1980s
- Dora María Téllez
- Jaime Wheelock, leader of the FSLN Proletarian Tendency, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development

See also


- Iran-Contra Affair
- Nicaragua v. United States
- Nicaraguan Sign Language - language that was born as a result of Sandinistas bringing deaf children together in schools for the deaf

Reference


- Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, Stephen Kinzer, Putnam Pub Group, ISBN 0399135944, 1991.
- Arias, Pilar. Nicaragua Revolucion Relatos De Combatientes Del Frente Sandinista. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1980.
- Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family. New York: Vintage Books, 1986.
- Gilbert, Dennis. Sandinistas: The Party And The Revolution. Blackwell Publishers, 1988.
- Hodges, Donald C. Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.
- Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff. The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
- Nolan, David. The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1984.
- Smith, Hazel. Nicaragua: Self-determination and Survival. Pluto Press, 1991. ISBN 0745304753
- Zimmermann, Matilde. Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Duke University Press, 2001.

External links


- [http://www.fsln-nicaragua.com www.fsln-nicaragua.com] Official Sandinista web page (in Spanish)
- [http://www.nicanet.org/sandinista_anniversary.php 25th Anniversary Celebration of the Sandinista Revolution] at [http://www.nicanet.org/ NicaNet]
- [http://nobelprize.org/literature/laureates/2005/pinter-lecture-e.html Nobel Lecture - Harold Pinter delivers Nobel Prize in Literature lecture in which he explains the Sandanista conflict and condemns the U.S.] Category:Revolutions Category:Political parties in Nicaragua Category:History of Nicaragua Category:Socialist International

Managua

Managua, with a population of about 1,817,096.2 in 2004, is the capital of Nicaragua Situated on the northwestern shore of Lake Managua, at , the city was made the national capital in 1855; previously the capital had alternated between the cities of León and Granada. Managua is overwhelmingly populated by Spanish-speaking Mestizos. There are also European communities Catalonian, Germans and French. Asians — entirely Japanese and Chinese (both mainlanders and Taiwanese) — are also a thriving economic force; they are responsible for many of the hotels and new centers of the "New Managua," they are heavily dedicated to entrepreneurial activity. Managua was damaged by earthquake and fire on March 31, 1931 and by fire again in 1936. On December 23, 1972, the city was very severely damaged in an earthquake that took more than 10,000 lives. In the aftermath, when international help came in to rebuild the town, the dictator Somoza and his troops allegedly took the donations and either hid them from the public or used the donations for themselves. As a result, the downtown area, devastated by the earthquake, was never rebuilt, and it remains half-empty even today. Those actions were a contributing factor to the Sandinistas' takeover of Nicaragua in 1979. Managua is considered very confusing for visitors, because it has no street names or addresses. After the 1972 earthquake the city regrew organically and street signs were generally not replaced. Directions are always given relative to landmarks, but landmarks are often used which no longer exist. (http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/592.cfm) The main international airport that serves Managua is Las Mercedes International Airport. Managua is also the birthplace of Nicaraguan Sign Language. The Sandinistas gathered deaf children who never learned to speak, but who could communicate clumsily with parents and family members using gestures, and put them together in an effort to engender "socialistic" education. The children then proceeded to communicate among themselves, and, in doing so, invented one of the world's newest languages. Category:Capitals in North America Category:Cities in Nicaragua ja:マナグア

Somoza

Somoza was the name of an influential family dictatorship in Nicaragua. Three of the Somozas served as President of Nicaragua. They were:
- Anastasio Somoza García (1937-1947, 1950-1956), the father
- Luis Somoza Debayle (1956-1963), his eldest son
- Anastasio Somoza Debayle (1967-1972, 1974-1979), his second eldest son Less notable members of the Somoza family include:
- Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero, son of Anastasio Somoza Debayle Anastasio Somoza Debayle was educated at the LaSalle Military Academy on Long Island and then went to college at West Point. President Somoza was president of Nicaragua until he was overthrown by the Sandinistas. Somoza's memoirs was called Nicaragua Betrayed. Category:Families Category:Nicaraguan people ja:ソモサ

Sandinista

:Sandinista! is also the name of a popular music album by The Clash. The Clash The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) is a leftist political party that ruled Nicaragua for roughly 12 years from 1979 to 1990. It is generally referred to by the initialism FSLN and its members are called, in both English and Spanish, Sandinistas. For many decades it was the main opposition group against the U.S.-backed dictatorship of the Somoza family. After emerging victorious from a brief civil war it formed the government of Nicaragua from 1979 until 1990, during which time it faced heavy opposition from the United States due to its Marxist ideology and resulting closeness with communist bloc countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, and Algeria. It lost the February 25, 1990 elections and peacefully surrendered power. The FSLN remains the country's leading political opposition to the current governing Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC).

Opposition to Somoza (1961–1979)

The FSLN was formally organised on July 23, 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge Martínez and Silvio Mayorga. It eventually became Marxist-aligned, and like many Communist groups began to present its struggle as a "movement for national liberation"; they claimed that the old government was oppressing and exploiting the Nicaraguan people and violating their rights, and promised to remedy these injustices. The Sandinistas took their name from Augusto César Sandino (1895-1934), a leader in the country's nationalist rebellion against the United States military occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and early 1930s until his assassination by the U.S.-created Guardia Nacional (National Guard) enabled Somoza to seize control of the country. Inspired and supported by the Cubans, the FSLN tried with little success to organise guerrilla warfare against Somoza in the 1960s. In the 1970s, it began to attract significant support from the country's increasingly politicised peasantry and from other sectors of the population in response to the U.S.-supported dictatorship's brutality and corruption, especially after the earthquake that levelled the capital city, Managua, on 23 December 1972. The earthquake killed 20,000 of the city's 400,000 residents and left another 250,000 homeless. Somoza's National Guard embezzled much of the international aid that flowed into the country to assist in reconstruction, and several parts of downtown Managua were never rebuilt. This overt corruption caused even people who had previously supported the regime, such as business leaders, to turn against Somoza and call for his overthrow. During the long struggle against Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the FSLN leaders' internal disagreements over strategy and tactics were reflected in three main factions:
- The guerra popular prolongada ("prolonged popular war") faction was rural-based and sought long-term "silent accumulation of forces" within the country's large peasant population, which it saw as the main social base for the revolution.
- The tendencia proletaria ("proletarian tendency"), led by Jaime Wheelock, reflected an orthodox Marxist approach that sought to organise urban workers.
- The tercerista ("third way") faction, led by Humberto and Daniel Ortega Saavedra, was ideologically eclectic, favouring a more rapid insurrectional strategy in alliance with diverse sectors of the country, including business owners, churches, students, the middle class, unemployed youth and the inhabitants of shantytowns. The terceristas also helped attract popular and international support by organising a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen (known as "the Twelve"), who called for Somoza's removal and sought to organise a provisional government from Costa Rica. On 10 January 1978, the assassination of Pedro Chamorro, who edited the anti-Somoza newspaper La Prensa, sparked a broad uprising against the regime, with the Sandinistas leading a combination of general strikes, urban uprisings and rural guerrilla attacks that increasingly demoralised the National Guard. With a moral and material help of many Latin American countries, Sandinistas launched liberation war from Costa Rica territory. Despite an overwhelming superiority in arms and ruthless tactics that included the aerial bombardment of Nicaraguan cities, Somoza's army disintegrated; he fled the country on 17 July 1979, and was later assassinated in Paraguay. Two days after Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas entered Managua and were greeted by huge crowds as national liberators.

Cuban assistance

Beginning in 1967 the Cuban General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, had begun to establish ties with various Nicaraguan revolutionary organisations. By 1970 the DGI had managed to train hundreds of Sandinista guerrilla leaders and had vast influence over the organisation. In 1969 the DGI had financed and organised an operation to free the jailed Sandinista leader Carlos Fonseca from his prison in Costa Rica. Fonseca was re-captured shortly after the jail break, but after a plane carrying executives from the United Fruit Company was hijacked by the FSLN, he was freed and allowed to travel to Cuba. DGI chief Manuel "Redbeard" Piñeiro commented that "of all the countries in Latin America, the most active work being carried out by us is in Nicaragua." However, one should keep in mind that there were many other Cuban operations throughout the world [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cuban_espionage_and_related_extraterritorial_activity_revised&action=edit§ion=5]. The DGI, with Fidel Castro's personal blessing, also collaborated with the FSLN on the botched assassination attempt of Turner Shelton, the U.S. ambassador in Managua and a close friend to the Somoza family. The FSLN managed to secure several hostages exchanging them for safe passage to Cuba and a one million dollar ransom. After the successful ouster of Somoza, DGI involvement in the new Sandinista government expanded rapidly. An early indication of the central role that the DGI would play in the Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship is a meeting in Havana on July 27, 1979, at which diplomatic ties between the two countries were re-established after more than 25 years. Julián López Díaz, a prominent DGI agent, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua. Cuban military and DGI advisors initially brought in during the Sandinista insurgency, would swell to over 2,500 and operated at all levels of the new Nicaraguan government. Sandinista defector Álvaro Baldizón alleged that Cuban influence in Nicaragua's Interior Ministry (MINT) was more extensive than was widely believed at the time and Cuban "advice" and "observations" were treated as though they were orders. While the Cubans would like to have helped more in the development of Nicaragua towards socialism, they realized that they were no match for the United States' pressure on Latin America. Following the invasion of Grenada, countries previously looking for support from Cuba saw that they had little power to fight the United States when it chose to take action. [Banana Republic, Roy Gutman, 1988]

Sandinista rule (1979–1990)

The Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins, with a debt of 1.6 billion dollars (US), an estimated 50,000 war dead, 600,000 homeless, and a devastated economic infrastructure. To begin the task of establishing a new government, they created a Council (or junta) of National Reconstruction, made up of five members – Sandinista militants Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan, novelist Sergio Ramírez Mercado (a member of "the Twelve"), businessman Alfonso Rebelo Callejas, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). The preponderance of power, however, remained with the Sandinistas and their mass organisations, including the Sandinista Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores), the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza), and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos). While prominent rebel leaders such as Daniel Ortega were strongly Marxist, the new junta initially contained a broad spectrum of ideology. Upon assuming power, its political platform included the following:
- Nationalisation of property owned by the Somozas and their collaborators.
- Land reform.
- Improved rural and urban working conditions.
- Free unionisation for all workers, both urban and rural.
- Control of living costs, especially basic necessities (food, clothing, and medicine).
- Improved public services, housing conditions, education (mandatory, free through high school; schools available to the whole national population; national literacy campaign).
- Nationalisation and protection of natural resources, including mines.
- Abolition of torture, political assassination and the death penalty.
- Protection of democratic liberties (freedom of expression, political organisation and association, and religion; return of political exiles).
- Equality for women.
- Free, non-aligned foreign policy and relations.
- Formation of a new, democratic, and popular army under the leadership of the FSLN.
- Pesticide controls
- Rain forest conservation
- Wildlife conservation
- Alternative energy programs One of the most notable successes of the revolution was the literacy campaign, which saw teachers flood the countryside. Within six months, half a million people had been taught to read, bringing the national illiteracy rate down from over 50 per cent to just under 13 per cent. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated as literacy teachers. One of the stated aims of the literacy campaign was to create a literate electorate which would be able to make informed choices at the promised elections. The great success of the literacy campaign was recognised by UNESCO with the award of a Nadezhda Krupskaya International Prize. The FSLN also created neighbourhood groups, similar to the Cuban Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, called Sandinista Defence Committees (Comités de Defensa Sandinista or CDS). Especially in the early days following the overthrow of Somoza, the CDSs served as de facto units of local governance, distributing food rations, organising neighbourhood cleanup and recreational activities, and policing to control looting and apprehend remnants of the National Guard. During the subsequent Contra war, they also organised civilian defence efforts against Contra attacks. Critics of the Sandinistas decried the CDS as a system of local spy networks for the government, and a means of political control. By 1980, conflicts began to emerge between the Sandinista and non-Sandinista members of the governing junta. Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta in 1980, and the governing role of the Sandinistas became obvious as Ortega and his allies consolidated power. Allegations spread among critics that the Ortega clique were planning to turn Nicaragua into a Communist state like Cuba. In 1981, the U.S. administration of Ronald Reagan began organising remnants of Somoza's National Guard into guerrilla bands known as "Contras" (short for "contrarrevolucionarios", or counter-revolutionaries) that conducted attacks on economic, military, and civilian targets. During the Contra war, the Sandinistas arrested suspected Contras and censored La Prensa as well as other publications that they accused of collaborating with the U.S. and the Contras to destabilise the country. In contrast to the Cuban revolution, the Sandinista government practised political pluralism throughout its time in power. A broad range of new political parties emerged that had not been allowed under Somoza. Following promulgation of a new constitution, Nicaragua held national elections in 1984. Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez were elected president and vice-president, and the FSLN won 61 out of 90 seats in the new National Assembly, having taken 63 per cent of the vote on a turnout of 74%. Independent electoral observers from around the world, including the UN, stated that the elections had been free and fair. The United States refused to recognise them, alleging that the opposition had been marginalised in the media and elsewhere by the government; United States President Ronald Reagan denounced the elections as a sham. Ronald Reagan, 1980. It reads "If the Gringos intervene (i.e. invade), the militias will stop them!!!"]]

Sandinistas vs. Contras

Main articles: Contras and Iran-Contra affair Upon assuming office in 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan condemned the FSLN for joining with Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries such as El Salvador. His administration authorised the CIA to begin financing, arming and training the remnants of Somoza's National Guard as anti-Sandinista guerrillas that were branded "counter-revolutionary" by leftists (contrarrevolucionarios in Spanish). This was inevitably shortened to Contras, a label the anti-Communist forces chose to embrace. Eden Pastora and many of the indigenous guerrilla forces, who were not associated with the "Somozistas," also resisted the Sandinistas. They operated out of camps in the neighbouring countries of Honduras to the north and Costa Rica (see Eden Pastora cited below) to the south. The U.S. also sought to place economic pressure on Nicaragua; the Reagan administration imposed a full trade embargo, and the CIA disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua's Corinto harbour, an action condemned by the World Court as illegal. As was typical in guerrilla warfare, the Contras were engaged in a campaign of economic sabotage in an attempt to combat the Sandinista government. The armed resistance to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica initially called itself the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and was known as the 15th of September Legion. It later formed an alliance, called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which comprised other groups including MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan Democratic Union. Together, the members of these groups were generally called Contras. The Sandinistas condemned them as terrorists, and human rights organisations expressed serious concerns over reports of Contra attacks on civilians. In 1982, under pressure from Congress, the U.S. State Department declared Contra activities terrorism. The Congressional intelligence committee confirmed reports of Contra atrocities such as rape, torture, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings. After the U.S. Congress prohibited federal funding of the Contras in 1983, the Reagan administration continued to back the Contras by covertly selling arms to Iran and channelling the proceeds to the Contras (The Iran-Contra affair.) When this scheme was revealed, Reagan admitted that he knew about the Iranian "arms for hostages" dealings but professed ignorance about the proceeds funding the Contras; for this, National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North took much of the blame. Senator John Kerry's 1988 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra-drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/index.htm] According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, Panama's drug-lord. The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance, linking the origins of crack cocaine in California to the contras. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the contras. Sen. John Kerry's report in 1988 led to the same conclusions. The Contra war unfolded differently in the northern and southern zones of Nicaragua. Contras based in Costa Rica operated in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, which is sparsely populated by indigenous groups including the Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Garifuno, and Mestizo. Unlike Spanish-speaking western Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast is predominantly English-speaking and was largely ignored by the Somoza regime. The costeños did not participate in the uprising against Somoza and viewed Sandinismo with suspicion from the outset.

Sandinista human rights abuses

Lacking support from the population in that part of the country, Sandinista troops committed their most controversial activities (as far as human rights are concerned) on the Atlantic Coast, including the forcible relocation of 8,500 Miskito from their land to create free-fire zones for combatting the Contras. They also killed and imprisoned several indigenous people suspected of Contra collaboration. On two separate occasions in 1981 and 1982, Sandinista troops committed massacres in which approximately (UNHCR Report) 34 Miskito Indians died. However many Sandinista supporters claim this pales in comparison to the deaths attributed to the Contras. [http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Miskitoeng/part1.htm] During the war Amnesty International and other groups reported that political prisoners in Sandinista prisons, such as in Las Tejas, were beaten, deprived of sleep and tortured with electric shocks. They were denied food and water and kept in dark cubicles that had a surface of less than one square metre, known as chiquitas ("little ones.") These cubicles were too small to sit up in and had no sanitation and almost no ventilation. In the mid-1980s, under pressure from human rights organizations and widespread international condemnation, the Sandinista government acknowledged errors in its dealings with the Atlantic Coast and successfully negotiated an end to the southern front of the Contra war. In fulfillment of the terms of that negotiation, the National Assembly unanimously passed an Autonomy Law in 1987 that made Nicaragua the first Latin American nation to recognise its multiethnic nature, guaranteeing the economic, cultural, linguistic and religious rights demanded by the indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast. The Reagan administration remained opposed to the Sandinistas, and continued to support the Contras. The administration also funnelled USD $11 million in support of an opposition party, and refused aid to the country after it was devastated by Hurricane Joan in October 1988.

Relationship with the Catholic Church

The Sandinistas' relationship with the Roman Catholic Church deteriorated as the Contra War dragged on. State media accused the Catholic Church of being reactionary and supporting the Contras. According to former President Ortega, "The conflict with the church was strong, and it cost us, but I don't think it was our fault... ...There were so many people being wounded every day, so many people dying, and it was hard for us to understand the position of the church hierarchy in refusing to condemn the contras." Hostility to the Catholic Church became so great that at one point, "...FSLN militants shouted down Pope John Paul II as he tried to say Mass." [http://www.fiu.edu/~yaf/sand71899.html]

Opposition (since 1990)

On February 26, 1990, Nicaragua held its second national election following the 1979 revolution, and this time the Sandinistas lost to the United Nicaraguan Opposition, an alliance of 14 opposition parties ranging from the conservative business organisation COSEP to Nicaraguan communists (see Nicaraguan Socialist Party. UNO's candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, replaced Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua. Reasons for the Sandinista loss in 1990 are disputed. Defenders of the defeated government assert that Nicaraguans voted for the opposition due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo and potential Contra threat. Opponents claim that Contra warfare had largely died down, and that the Sandinistas had grown increasingly unpopular, particularly due to forced conscription and crackdowns on political freedoms. They also point out that the Sandinistas lost both the 1996 and 2001 elections with no Contra threat or outside pressures from the U.S. After their loss, some of the Sandinista leaders held part of the property that had been nationalised by the FSLN government. This process became known as the piñata and was tolerated by the new government. Prominent Sandinistas also created a number of nongovernmental organisations to promote their ideas and social goals, such as the Augusto César Sandino Foundation (FACS). Daniel Ortega remained the head of the FSLN, but his brother Humberto resigned from the party and remained at the head of the Sandinista Army, becoming a close confidante and supporter of Chamorro. The party also experienced a number of internal divisions, with prominent Sandinistas such as Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez resigning to protest what they described as heavy-handed domination of the party by Daniel Ortega. Ramírez also founded a separate political party, the Movement for the Renovation of Sandinismo (MRS); his faction came to be known as the renovistas, who favor a more social democratic approach than the orthodoxos, or hardliners. In the 1996 Nicaraguan election, Ortega and Ramírez both campaigned unsuccessfully as presidential candidates on behalf of their respective parties, with Ortega receiving 43 percent of the vote while Arnoldo Alemán of the Constitutional Liberal Party received 51 percent. Daniel Ortega was re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in 1998. Municipal elections in November 2000 saw a strong Sandinista vote, especially in urban areas, and former Tourism Minister Herty Lewites was elected mayor of Managua. This significant result led to expectations of a close race in the presidential elections scheduled for November 2001. Daniel Ortega and Enrique Bolaños of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) ran neck and neck in the polls for much of the campaign, but in the end the PLC won a clear victory. At these elections, 4 November 2001, the party won 42.1 % of the popular vote and 43 out of 90 seats. The same day, José Daniel Ortega Saavedra was defeated by the Enrique Bolaños Geyer of the Constitutional Liberal Party, winning only 42.3 %. Daniel Ortega, who still enjoys the use of confiscated estates, was once again re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in March 2002. Ortega's recent alliance with the partisans of Alemán (now in jail for for corruption) to attempt to unseat democratically elected Bolaños, seems to have come apart.

Symbols

The flag of the FSLN consists of an upper half in red, the lower half in black and the letters F S L N in white.

Prominent Sandinistas


- Bayardo Arce, hard-line National Directorate member in the 1980s
- Patrick Arguello, a Sandinista involved with the Dawson's Field hijackings
- Monica Baltodano
- Tomás Borge, one of the FSLN's founders, leader of the explicitly Marxist Prolonged Popular War tendency in the 1970s, Minister of Interior in the 1980s
- Omar Cabezas
- Ernesto Cardenal, poet and Catholic priest, Minister of Culture in the 1980s
- Luis Carrion, National Directorate member in the 1980s
- Miguel d'Escoto, a Maryknoll Catholic priest, served as Nicaragua's foreign minister
- Carlos Fonseca, one of the FSLN's principal founders and leading ideologist in the 1960s
- Herty Lewites, former mayor of Managua, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 2005
- Vilma Núñez
- Daniel Ortega, post-revolution junta head, then President from 1985, lost presidential elections in 1990, 1996, and 2001, but continues to control the FSLN party
- Humberto Ortega, leader of the FSLN Insurrectional Tendency (Tercerista) in the 1970s, chief strategist of the anti-Somoza urban insurrection, Minister of Defense in the 1980s during the Contra war
- Edén Pastora, "Comandante Cero," social democratic guerrilla leader who joined the Terceristas during the anti-Somoza insurrection, broke with FSLN to lead center-left ARDE contra group based in Costa Rica during the early 1980s
- Sergio Ramirez, novelist and civilian Sandinista, architect of alliance with moderates in 1970s, Vice President in 1980s, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 1990s
- Henry Ruíz, "Comandante Modesto," FSLN rural guerrilla commander in the 1970s, member of the National Directorate in the 1980s
- Dora María Téllez
- Jaime Wheelock, leader of the FSLN Proletarian Tendency, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development

See also


- Iran-Contra Affair
- Nicaragua v. United States
- Nicaraguan Sign Language - language that was born as a result of Sandinistas bringing deaf children together in schools for the deaf

Reference


- Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, Stephen Kinzer, Putnam Pub Group, ISBN 0399135944, 1991.
- Arias, Pilar. Nicaragua Revolucion Relatos De Combatientes Del Frente Sandinista. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1980.
- Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family. New York: Vintage Books, 1986.
- Gilbert, Dennis. Sandinistas: The Party And The Revolution. Blackwell Publishers, 1988.
- Hodges, Donald C. Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.
- Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff. The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
- Nolan, David. The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1984.
- Smith, Hazel. Nicaragua: Self-determination and Survival. Pluto Press, 1991. ISBN 0745304753
- Zimmermann, Matilde. Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Duke University Press, 2001.

External links


- [http://www.fsln-nicaragua.com www.fsln-nicaragua.com] Official Sandinista web page (in Spanish)
- [http://www.nicanet.org/sandinista_anniversary.php 25th Anniversary Celebration of the Sandinista Revolution] at [http://www.nicanet.org/ NicaNet]
- [http://nobelprize.org/literature/laureates/2005/pinter-lecture-e.html Nobel Lecture - Harold Pinter delivers Nobel Prize in Literature lecture in which he explains the Sandanista conflict and condemns the U.S.] Category:Revolutions Category:Political parties in Nicaragua Category:History of Nicaragua Category:Socialist International

Guardia Nacional (Nicaragua)

The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, otherwise known as Guardia or in English Nicaraguan National Guard, was a militia created during the occupation of that country by the United States. It became notorious for human rights abuses and corruption under the regime of the Somoza family.

Creation

Prior to the U.S. occupation, the long period of civil strife had encouraged the development of a variety of private armies. The freshly-elected government of President Carlos José Solórzano requested that the U.S. Marines (equally interested in central control) remain in Nicaragua until an indigenous security force could be trained; the Nicaraguan government hired a retired US General to set up the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. US forces left in 1925, but after a brief resurgence of violence, returned in 1926, taking over command of the National Guard until 1933, when it was returned to Nicaraguan control under the government of Juan Bautista Sacasa. Sacasa, under political pressure from José María Moncada, who had been a leader of a rebel faction which later joined the government after U.S. mediation efforts, appointed Anastasio Somoza García as chief director of the National Guard. Somoza Garcia was trusted as a friend of Moncada, a supporter of the liberal revolt, and a nephew of Sacasa. He was trusted by the U.S. from his service as a translator to Henry Stimson during the 1927 peace conference, schooling in the U.S., and training under the U.S. Marines (apparently, as an officer in the National Guard). After the departure of U.S. troops in 1933 (at the depth of the Great Depression), the Sacasa government opened negotiations with the rebel faction of Augusto César Sandino. Sandino insisted on the dissolution of the National Guard, leading Somoza Garcia to react ruthlessly by arresting and executing Sandino, in violation of a safe passage agreement Sacasa had given the rebel leader. The National Guard then swiftly defeated Sandino's forces, further weakening the Sacasa government. By this time the force had grown to some 3000 troops. After using the influence of the National Guard to support Sacasa's re-election in 1936, Somoza Garcia flouted civilian power, installing military cronies in key civilian posts and forcing Sacasa to resign that June. With an ally appointed interim president, Somoza Garcia then resigned from the National Guard position of chief director in order to meet constitutional requirements to run for the presidency himself. Breaking with the party, he established the Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN, National Liberal Party) and won the election with a remarkable 107,201 votes to 108. On January 1, 1937, President Somoza Garcia reappointed himself chief director of the National Guard, beginning a military dictatorship that would last four decades.

Somoza régime

Somoza Garcia rapidly took complete control of Nicaraguan institutions including the National Guard, promoting allies and purging enemies. The National Guard was the backbone of a growing network of control, eventually including telecommunications, railroads, and key civilian agencies from customs to hospitals to tax collection. In 1938, Somoza Garcia appointed a civilian assembly that rubber-stamped constitutional changes allowing him to stay in office; his personal fortune expanded as he and his family took over key areas of the private economy. Increasingly pervasive corruption comparable to a gangland mob, with bribery, kickbacks, and sometimes violent enforcement, protected the power of the Somoza family at all levels. The U.S. supported the National Guard through the World War II Lend-Lease act and under the terms of the Rio Treaty, but did not publicly approve of Somoza Garcia's extraconstitutional governance. The National Guard, which had been limited to small arms and was largely composed of rifle companies, began to acquire surplus equipment such as tanks and artillery. The regime permitted nominal political dissent, and in 1947 agreed to elections, hoping to mollify both Washington and local opponents, but quickly deposed the winning candidate in a coup d'etat that brought strong disapproval from the United States. Under a new constitution, an assembly-appointed president, and a strong anti-communist stance relations improved. Nevertheless Somoza Garcia was the power behind the curtain and an increasing target of attempted coups and assassination; he even developed a personal bodyguard separate from the National Guard. In 1956, Somoza Garcia was fatally shot by a young dissident poet. Succeeded in the presidency by one son, Luis Somoza Debayle, he was succeeded as head of the National Guard by another, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Brutal repression of political opposition followed. In 1957, the National Guard was involved in the only external military action of its existence, a brief border skirmish with Honduras. The National Guard cooperated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the Bay of Pigs attempted invasion of Cuba, permitting its bases to be used for training and staging areas. In 1965, the National Guard participated in a peacekeeping operation in the Dominican Republic under the aegis of the OAS. Even as trusted friends of the family succeeded Luis in the presidency, his brother remained firmly in control of the National Guard. Eventually, in 1967, Anastasio himself was elected president; Luis soon died of a heart attack, leaving Anastasio in sole control. Without his brother's technocratic influence, Anastasio's corrupt ways were unrestrained. The 1972 earthquake, which severely damaged the capital of Managua, brought further evidence of corruption, as members of the National Guard openly looted damaged businesses and misappropriated international aid, and Somoza Debayle's personal wealth soared during the reconstruction period. In 1974, the growing Sandinista movement FSLN (named after the assassinated Sandino) succeeded in forcing the government to accept an amnesty, after which Somoza Debayle declared a state of siege and the National Guard launched a violent and repressive reaction. Though the FSLN was weakened, so was the regime.

Collapse

After the election of Jimmy Carter in the United States, human rights objections left the Somoza Debayle government with its longstanding support from the U.S. severely diminished (direct military aid would end in 1978). After the assassination of opposition leader Pedro Chamorro, probably by National Guard members acting under the orders of Somoza Debayle, the public reacted with a series of nationwide strikes and increasing political organization against the regime. The National Guard grew to a force of more than 10,000, with localized security companies throughout the country and modern specialized units such as mechanized and engineer battalions, a Presidential Guard, and a reinforced tactical battalion. The strengthened National Guard continued to tighten its grip but opposition only grew broader and fiercer. After a humiliating hostage crisis with Sandinista rebels taking over the National Assembly, the regime worried about a coup d'etat from within the National Guard and purged many top officers. In 1979, now facing an open civil war and losing territory and political allies, Somoza Debayle fled the country along with many members of the National Guard. First flying to Miami, he would later be assassinated in Paraguay. The Sandinista junta replaced the Gardia Nacional with two new bodies, the Ejército Popular Sandinista (EPS, Sandinista People's Army) and the Policía Sandinista (Sandinista Police). Eventually, alumni of the National Guard would be reconstituted, with the support of the CIA and Honduras, as the contra rebels.

External links


- [http://www.country-studies.com/nicaragua/ Country Studies: Nicaragua]
- [http://www.thinkquest.org/library/site_sum.html?tname=17749&url=17749/somoza.html ThinkQuest: Somoza Dynasty]
- [http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/COLDnicaragua.htm Spartacus Schoolnet]
- [http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/clas/nicaragua_proj/history/somoza/Hist-Somoza-dinasty.pdf History of the Somoza Dynasty] (PDF)
- [http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/nicaragua/nicaragua110.html Nicaraguan National Guard] - original source LOC Category:History of Nicaragua Category:Law enforcement in Nicaragua

Sandinista National Liberation Front

:Sandinista! is also the name of a popular music album by The Clash. The Clash The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) is a leftist political party that ruled Nicaragua for roughly 12 years from 1979 to 1990. It is generally referred to by the initialism FSLN and its members are called, in both English and Spanish, Sandinistas. For many decades it was the main opposition group against the U.S.-backed dictatorship of the Somoza family. After emerging victorious from a brief civil war it formed the government of Nicaragua from 1979 until 1990, during which time it faced heavy opposition from the United States due to its Marxist ideology and resulting closeness with communist bloc countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, and Algeria. It lost the February 25, 1990 elections and peacefully surrendered power. The FSLN remains the country's leading political opposition to the current governing Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC).

Opposition to Somoza (1961–1979)

The FSLN was formally organised on July 23, 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge Martínez and Silvio Mayorga. It eventually became Marxist-aligned, and like many Communist groups began to present its struggle as a "movement for national liberation"; they claimed that the old government was oppressing and exploiting the Nicaraguan people and violating their rights, and promised to remedy these injustices. The Sandinistas took their name from Augusto César Sandino (1895-1934), a leader in the country's nationalist rebellion against the United States military occupation of Nicaragua in the 1920s and early 1930s until his assassination by the U.S.-created Guardia Nacional (National Guard) enabled Somoza to seize control of the country. Inspired and supported by the Cubans, the FSLN tried with little success to organise guerrilla warfare against Somoza in the 1960s. In the 1970s, it began to attract significant support from the country's increasingly politicised peasantry and from other sectors of the population in response to the U.S.-supported dictatorship's brutality and corruption, especially after the earthquake that levelled the capital city, Managua, on 23 December 1972. The earthquake killed 20,000 of the city's 400,000 residents and left another 250,000 homeless. Somoza's National Guard embezzled much of the international aid that flowed into the country to assist in reconstruction, and several parts of downtown Managua were never rebuilt. This overt corruption caused even people who had previously supported the regime, such as business leaders, to turn against Somoza and call for his overthrow. During the long struggle against Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the FSLN leaders' internal disagreements over strategy and tactics were reflected in three main factions:
- The guerra popular prolongada ("prolonged popular war") faction was rural-based and sought long-term "silent accumulation of forces" within the country's large peasant population, which it saw as the main social base for the revolution.
- The tendencia proletaria ("proletarian tendency"), led by Jaime Wheelock, reflected an orthodox Marxist approach that sought to organise urban workers.
- The tercerista ("third way") faction, led by Humberto and Daniel Ortega Saavedra, was ideologically eclectic, favouring a more rapid insurrectional strategy in alliance with diverse sectors of the country, including business owners, churches, students, the middle class, unemployed youth and the inhabitants of shantytowns. The terceristas also helped attract popular and international support by organising a group of prominent Nicaraguan professionals, business leaders, and clergymen (known as "the Twelve"), who called for Somoza's removal and sought to organise a provisional government from Costa Rica. On 10 January 1978, the assassination of Pedro Chamorro, who edited the anti-Somoza newspaper La Prensa, sparked a broad uprising against the regime, with the Sandinistas leading a combination of general strikes, urban uprisings and rural guerrilla attacks that increasingly demoralised the National Guard. With a moral and material help of many Latin American countries, Sandinistas launched liberation war from Costa Rica territory. Despite an overwhelming superiority in arms and ruthless tactics that included the aerial bombardment of Nicaraguan cities, Somoza's army disintegrated; he fled the country on 17 July 1979, and was later assassinated in Paraguay. Two days after Somoza's departure, the Sandinistas entered Managua and were greeted by huge crowds as national liberators.

Cuban assistance

Beginning in 1967 the Cuban General Intelligence Directorate, or DGI, had begun to establish ties with various Nicaraguan revolutionary organisations. By 1970 the DGI had managed to train hundreds of Sandinista guerrilla leaders and had vast influence over the organisation. In 1969 the DGI had financed and organised an operation to free the jailed Sandinista leader Carlos Fonseca from his prison in Costa Rica. Fonseca was re-captured shortly after the jail break, but after a plane carrying executives from the United Fruit Company was hijacked by the FSLN, he was freed and allowed to travel to Cuba. DGI chief Manuel "Redbeard" Piñeiro commented that "of all the countries in Latin America, the most active work being carried out by us is in Nicaragua." However, one should keep in mind that there were many other Cuban operations throughout the world [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Cuban_espionage_and_related_extraterritorial_activity_revised&action=edit§ion=5]. The DGI, with Fidel Castro's personal blessing, also collaborated with the FSLN on the botched assassination attempt of Turner Shelton, the U.S. ambassador in Managua and a close friend to the Somoza family. The FSLN managed to secure several hostages exchanging them for safe passage to Cuba and a one million dollar ransom. After the successful ouster of Somoza, DGI involvement in the new Sandinista government expanded rapidly. An early indication of the central role that the DGI would play in the Cuban-Nicaraguan relationship is a meeting in Havana on July 27, 1979, at which diplomatic ties between the two countries were re-established after more than 25 years. Julián López Díaz, a prominent DGI agent, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua. Cuban military and DGI advisors initially brought in during the Sandinista insurgency, would swell to over 2,500 and operated at all levels of the new Nicaraguan government. Sandinista defector Álvaro Baldizón alleged that Cuban influence in Nicaragua's Interior Ministry (MINT) was more extensive than was widely believed at the time and Cuban "advice" and "observations" were treated as though they were orders. While the Cubans would like to have helped more in the development of Nicaragua towards socialism, they realized that they were no match for the United States' pressure on Latin America. Following the invasion of Grenada, countries previously looking for support from Cuba saw that they had little power to fight the United States when it chose to take action. [Banana Republic, Roy Gutman, 1988]

Sandinista rule (1979–1990)

The Sandinistas inherited a country in ruins, with a debt of 1.6 billion dollars (US), an estimated 50,000 war dead, 600,000 homeless, and a devastated economic infrastructure. To begin the task of establishing a new government, they created a Council (or junta) of National Reconstruction, made up of five members – Sandinista militants Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan, novelist Sergio Ramírez Mercado (a member of "the Twelve"), businessman Alfonso Rebelo Callejas, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro (the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). The preponderance of power, however, remained with the Sandinistas and their mass organisations, including the Sandinista Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores), the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Nicaraguan Women's Association (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza), and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos). While prominent rebel leaders such as Daniel Ortega were strongly Marxist, the new junta initially contained a broad spectrum of ideology. Upon assuming power, its political platform included the following:
- Nationalisation of property owned by the Somozas and their collaborators.
- Land reform.
- Improved rural and urban working conditions.
- Free unionisation for all workers, both urban and rural.
- Control of living costs, especially basic necessities (food, clothing, and medicine).
- Improved public services, housing conditions, education (mandatory, free through high school; schools available to the whole national population; national literacy campaign).
- Nationalisation and protection of natural resources, including mines.
- Abolition of torture, political assassination and the death penalty.
- Protection of democratic liberties (freedom of expression, political organisation and association, and religion; return of political exiles).
- Equality for women.
- Free, non-aligned foreign policy and relations.
- Formation of a new, democratic, and popular army under the leadership of the FSLN.
- Pesticide controls
- Rain forest conservation
- Wildlife conservation
- Alternative energy programs One of the most notable successes of the revolution was the literacy campaign, which saw teachers flood the countryside. Within six months, half a million people had been taught to read, bringing the national illiteracy rate down from over 50 per cent to just under 13 per cent. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated as literacy teachers. One of the stated aims of the literacy campaign was to create a literate electorate which would be able to make informed choices at the promised elections. The great success of the literacy campaign was recognised by UNESCO with the award of a Nadezhda Krupskaya International Prize. The FSLN also created neighbourhood groups, similar to the Cuban Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, called Sandinista Defence Committees (Comités de Defensa Sandinista or CDS). Especially in the early days following the overthrow of Somoza, the CDSs served as de facto units of local governance, distributing food rations, organising neighbourhood cleanup and recreational activities, and policing to control looting and apprehend remnants of the National Guard. During the subsequent Contra war, they also organised civilian defence efforts against Contra attacks. Critics of the Sandinistas decried the CDS as a system of local spy networks for the government, and a means of political control. By 1980, conflicts began to emerge between the Sandinista and non-Sandinista members of the governing junta. Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned from the governing junta in 1980, and the governing role of the Sandinistas became obvious as Ortega and his allies consolidated power. Allegations spread among critics that the Ortega clique were planning to turn Nicaragua into a Communist state like Cuba. In 1981, the U.S. administration of Ronald Reagan began organising remnants of Somoza's National Guard into guerrilla bands known as "Contras" (short for "contrarrevolucionarios", or counter-revolutionaries) that conducted attacks on economic, military, and civilian targets. During the Contra war, the Sandinistas arrested suspected Contras and censored La Prensa as well as other publications that they accused of collaborating with the U.S. and the Contras to destabilise the country. In contrast to the Cuban revolution, the Sandinista government practised political pluralism throughout its time in power. A broad range of new political parties emerged that had not been allowed under Somoza. Following promulgation of a new constitution, Nicaragua held national elections in 1984. Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez were elected president and vice-president, and the FSLN won 61 out of 90 seats in the new National Assembly, having taken 63 per cent of the vote on a turnout of 74%. Independent electoral observers from around the world, including the UN, stated that the elections had been free and fair. The United States refused to recognise them, alleging that the opposition had been marginalised in the media and elsewhere by the government; United States President Ronald Reagan denounced the elections as a sham. Ronald Reagan, 1980. It reads "If the Gringos intervene (i.e. invade), the militias will stop them!!!"]]

Sandinistas vs. Contras

Main articles: Contras and Iran-Contra affair Upon assuming office in 1981, U.S. President Ronald Reagan condemned the FSLN for joining with Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries such as El Salvador. His administration authorised the CIA to begin financing, arming and training the remnants of Somoza's National Guard as anti-Sandinista guerrillas that were branded "counter-revolutionary" by leftists (contrarrevolucionarios in Spanish). This was inevitably shortened to Contras, a label the anti-Communist forces chose to embrace. Eden Pastora and many of the indigenous guerrilla forces, who were not associated with the "Somozistas," also resisted the Sandinistas. They operated out of camps in the neighbouring countries of Honduras to the north and Costa Rica (see Eden Pastora cited below) to the south. The U.S. also sought to place economic pressure on Nicaragua; the Reagan administration imposed a full trade embargo, and the CIA disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua's Corinto harbour, an action condemned by the World Court as illegal. As was typical in guerrilla warfare, the Contras were engaged in a campaign of economic sabotage in an attempt to combat the Sandinista government. The armed resistance to the Sandinistas in Costa Rica initially called itself the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ADREN) and was known as the 15th of September Legion. It later formed an alliance, called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), which comprised other groups including MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan Democratic Union. Together, the members of these groups were generally called Contras. The Sandinistas condemned them as terrorists, and human rights organisations expressed serious concerns over reports of Contra attacks on civilians. In 1982, under pressure from Congress, the U.S. State Department declared Contra activities terrorism. The Congressional intelligence committee confirmed reports of Contra atrocities such as rape, torture, summary executions, and indiscriminate killings. After the U.S. Congress prohibited federal funding of the Contras in 1983, the Reagan administration continued to back the Contras by covertly selling arms to Iran and channelling the proceeds to the Contras (The Iran-Contra affair.) When this scheme was revealed, Reagan admitted that he knew about the Iranian "arms for hostages" dealings but professed ignorance about the proceeds funding the Contras; for this, National Security Council aide Lt. Col. Oliver North took much of the blame. Senator John Kerry's 1988 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra-drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB113/index.htm] According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, Panama's drug-lord. The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, San Jose Mercury News reporter Gary Webb published a series titled Dark Alliance, linking the origins of crack cocaine in California to the contras. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the contras. Sen. John Kerry's report in 1988 led to the same conclusions. The Contra war unfolded differently in the northern and southern zones of Nicaragua. Contras based in Costa Rica operated in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, which is sparsely populated by indigenous groups including the Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Garifuno, and Mestizo. Unlike Spanish-speaking western Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast is predominantly English-speaking and was largely ignored by the Somoza regime. The costeños did not participate in the uprising against Somoza and viewed Sandinismo with suspicion from the outset.

Sandinista human rights abuses

Lacking support from the population in that part of the country, Sandinista troops committed their most controversial activities (as far as human rights are concerned) on the Atlantic Coast, including the forcible relocation of 8,500 Miskito from their land to create free-fire zones for combatting the Contras. They also killed and imprisoned several indigenous people suspected of Contra collaboration. On two separate occasions in 1981 and 1982, Sandinista troops committed massacres in which approximately (UNHCR Report) 34 Miskito Indians died. However many Sandinista supporters claim this pales in comparison to the deaths attributed to the Contras. [http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Miskitoeng/part1.htm] During the war Amnesty International and other groups reported that political prisoners in Sandinista prisons, such as in Las Tejas, were beaten, deprived of sleep and tortured with electric shocks. They were denied food and water and kept in dark cubicles that had a surface of less than one square metre, known as chiquitas ("little ones.") These cubicles were too small to sit up in and had no sanitation and almost no ventilation. In the mid-1980s, under pressure from human rights organizations and widespread international condemnation, the Sandinista government acknowledged errors in its dealings with the Atlantic Coast and successfully negotiated an end to the southern front of the Contra war. In fulfillment of the terms of that negotiation, the National Assembly unanimously passed an Autonomy Law in 1987 that made Nicaragua the first Latin American nation to recognise its multiethnic nature, guaranteeing the economic, cultural, linguistic and religious rights demanded by the indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast. The Reagan administration remained opposed to the Sandinistas, and continued to support the Contras. The administration also funnelled USD $11 million in support of an opposition party, and refused aid to the country after it was devastated by Hurricane Joan in October 1988.

Relationship with the Catholic Church

The Sandinistas' relationship with the Roman Catholic Church deteriorated as the Contra War dragged on. State media accused the Catholic Church of being reactionary and supporting the Contras. According to former President Ortega, "The conflict with the church was strong, and it cost us, but I don't think it was our fault... ...There were so many people being wounded every day, so many people dying, and it was hard for us to understand the position of the church hierarchy in refusing to condemn the contras." Hostility to the Catholic Church became so great that at one point, "...FSLN militants shouted down Pope John Paul II as he tried to say Mass." [http://www.fiu.edu/~yaf/sand71899.html]

Opposition (since 1990)

On February 26, 1990, Nicaragua held its second national election following the 1979 revolution, and this time the Sandinistas lost to the United Nicaraguan Opposition, an alliance of 14 opposition parties ranging from the conservative business organisation COSEP to Nicaraguan communists (see Nicaraguan Socialist Party. UNO's candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, replaced Daniel Ortega as president of Nicaragua. Reasons for the Sandinista loss in 1990 are disputed. Defenders of the defeated government assert that Nicaraguans voted for the opposition due to the continuing U.S. economic embargo and potential Contra threat. Opponents claim that Contra warfare had largely died down, and that the Sandinistas had grown increasingly unpopular, particularly due to forced conscription and crackdowns on political freedoms. They also point out that the Sandinistas lost both the 1996 and 2001 elections with no Contra threat or outside pressures from the U.S. After their loss, some of the Sandinista leaders held part of the property that had been nationalised by the FSLN government. This process became known as the piñata and was tolerated by the new government. Prominent Sandinistas also created a number of nongovernmental organisations to promote their ideas and social goals, such as the Augusto César Sandino Foundation (FACS). Daniel Ortega remained the head of the FSLN, but his brother Humberto resigned from the party and remained at the head of the Sandinista Army, becoming a close confidante and supporter of Chamorro. The party also experienced a number of internal divisions, with prominent Sandinistas such as Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez resigning to protest what they described as heavy-handed domination of the party by Daniel Ortega. Ramírez also founded a separate political party, the Movement for the Renovation of Sandinismo (MRS); his faction came to be known as the renovistas, who favor a more social democratic approach than the orthodoxos, or hardliners. In the 1996 Nicaraguan election, Ortega and Ramírez both campaigned unsuccessfully as presidential candidates on behalf of their respective parties, with Ortega receiving 43 percent of the vote while Arnoldo Alemán of the Constitutional Liberal Party received 51 percent. Daniel Ortega was re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in 1998. Municipal elections in November 2000 saw a strong Sandinista vote, especially in urban areas, and former Tourism Minister Herty Lewites was elected mayor of Managua. This significant result led to expectations of a close race in the presidential elections scheduled for November 2001. Daniel Ortega and Enrique Bolaños of the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC) ran neck and neck in the polls for much of the campaign, but in the end the PLC won a clear victory. At these elections, 4 November 2001, the party won 42.1 % of the popular vote and 43 out of 90 seats. The same day, José Daniel Ortega Saavedra was defeated by the Enrique Bolaños Geyer of the Constitutional Liberal Party, winning only 42.3 %. Daniel Ortega, who still enjoys the use of confiscated estates, was once again re-elected as leader of the Sandinistas in March 2002. Ortega's recent alliance with the partisans of Alemán (now in jail for for corruption) to attempt to unseat democratically elected Bolaños, seems to have come apart.

Symbols

The flag of the FSLN consists of an upper half in red, the lower half in black and the letters F S L N in white.

Prominent Sandinistas


- Bayardo Arce, hard-line National Directorate member in the 1980s
- Patrick Arguello, a Sandinista involved with the Dawson's Field hijackings
- Monica Baltodano
- Tomás Borge, one of the FSLN's founders, leader of the explicitly Marxist Prolonged Popular War tendency in the 1970s, Minister of Interior in the 1980s
- Omar Cabezas
- Ernesto Cardenal, poet and Catholic priest, Minister of Culture in the 1980s
- Luis Carrion, National Directorate member in the 1980s
- Miguel d'Escoto, a Maryknoll Catholic priest, served as Nicaragua's foreign minister
- Carlos Fonseca, one of the FSLN's principal founders and leading ideologist in the 1960s
- Herty Lewites, former mayor of Managua, opponent of Daniel Ortega in 2005
- Vilma Núñez
- Daniel Ortega, post-revolution junta head, then President from 1